From Bhutto to Imran: What Lessons for Islamic Revolutionaries

Thrice in recent history of the subcontinent has a charismatic leader succeeded in building a mass movement among the Muslims. Among the Hindus, this has happened twice – under Mohandas Gandhi and Narindra Modi. On the other hand, Islamic revolutionaries have never succeeded in achieving a sustained mass mobilization. Even the jihad movements of the 19th century – those led by Syed Badshah, Haji Shariatullah, General Bakht Khan, Hazrat Shaikh-al-Mashaikh Haji Imdadullah Muhajir Makki and the Sadiqpuri Sayyids (may Allah bless them) – failed to arouse mass enthusiasm.

Why have the secularists succeeded and why have we failed in attracting mass support. This is an important question which the Islamic revolutionary agenda must address – for without mass mobilization and support it is not possible to achieve a revolutionary Islamic breakthrough at the systemic level. This essay represents a preliminary attempt to raise this question.

Secular Mass Mobilization

The three successful mass mobilization movements among Muslims in the subcontinent have been led by Mr. Jinnah, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan. The first of them that led by Mr. Jinnah in the 1940s, was an ideological movement inspired by Muslim nationalism. The second that of Mr. Bhutto in the 1970s espoused democratic “Islamic” socialism. Imran Khan’s movement seeks mass legitimacy through liberal nationalist themes. Unlike Mr. Jinnah (who was a staunch believer in Muslim nationalism) neither Bhutto nor Imran are committed ideologues (as is evident from their performance when in power) but like Mr. Jinnah both Bhutto and Imran have succeeded in achieving cult status as mass saviors. Bhutto’s mass charisma was sustained by committed Marxists and social democrats who galvanized the movement, particularly during its peak days. Imran apparently lacks such an ideological back staffing and the ideological content of his mass appeal is more diffuse but he is popularly seen as a symbolic struggler against felt capitalistic injustices.
Ideology – false consciousness – has always been a subordinated element in arousing mass support for the secular movements. The main thrust of the secular appeals to the masses is on the charismatic character of its symbolic leader who is preached as a godlike figure capable of fulfilling the aspirations (whatever they may be) of a mobilized segment of mass political activists. As has been shown in several studies Pakistani masses are passive political participants expecting salvation from charismatic leaders not much concerned with the ideological content of the leader’s message. This attitude of the masses is an enduring colonial legacy.

Unlike Latin America where some political and business erected by colonialism were at least partially contested since the mid-19th century, colonial governance structures have remained strong in Pakistan and secular mass mobilization movements have been based upon them – for support. Neither Mr. Jinnah nor Bhutto nor Imran Khan have ever tried to step out of the constitutional framework established by the British India Act of 1935 – four-fifth of the provisions of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution are taken almost verbatim from the 1935 Act and this constitutional framework has always been sacred in the eyes of the charismatic leaders – Jinnah, Bhutto and Imran. Secular mass movements are not movements for systematic change in Pakistan’s governance system – quite the contrary they are movements for protecting and promoting colonial rule.

This makes it possible for the incumbent governing elites to support secular mass mobilization movements. As the secular mass mobilization gathers momentum sections of the politico-economic elites jump into the bandwagon. A limited circulation of elites is achieved – the dwindling ranks of party ideologues, Muslim nationalists, Marxists, social democrats, and liberals are dismissed – and the same bureaucrats, generals, capitalists, landlords, and corruption mafia surmount power structures facilitated by Jinnah, Bhutto and Imran. Efforts are made to appease imperialism. Efforts at promoting capitalist justice through systemic reform are indefinitely postponed. The charismatic leader becomes a willing tool of the corruption mafia. This did not happen to Jinnah because of his ideological stance and commitment to Muslim nationalism but Bhutto and Imran have both succumbed to corruption.

Lessons for Islamic Revolutionaries

There are three important lessons to be learnt from these episodes of secular mass mobilization.
The first lesson to be learnt is that Islamic revolutionaries must not become part of secular mass mobilization movements. We stand for the establishment of Islamic rule and do not accept the approach to capitalist justice as a means for achieving this end. Legitimating capitalist justice quests – through the promotion of human or social rights – undermine Islamic consciousness and is necessarily a means for societal secularization. We should refuse to take sides in the interim elite struggles for power in which the masses are befooled to become participants. We should emphasize the futility of these struggles and stress the similarity in the political agenda of the elite combatants especially in terms of their relationship to imperial powers.

Secondly, we must stress that mass secular movements are not struggles for deconstructing the capitalist state – the governance system which institutionalizes exploitations and submission to the commands of the baser self – the nafs-e-ammara. The constitutional order established by the provisions of the 1935 India Act must be comprehensively dismantled to establish Islamic rule. We stand for a reconstruction of the state – not for the institutionalization of the rule of law of capital. Reconstructing the structures of the state is an essential step for the social empowerment of the mukhliseen-e-deen and without their empowerment the Islamic governance order cannot be established.

Superficially it appears that the governance order is unravelling – the deeply divided judiciary is at loggerheads with the legislature and the security system is disenchanted. In reality neither the political nor the economic nor the social order is imperiled. Whether the elections are held or a state of emergency is imposed, whether we default or appease the IMF via the 2024 budget the system of governance will remain the same. There is no threat to the system of governance or the rule of law of capital because there is no viable alternative being prepared to replace it. We are in a non-revolutionary situation because there are no revolutionary forces organizing a revolutionary response to the institutional systemic imposition of capitalist/imperialist order. Today as in 1969 and 1979 the Jamat-e-Islami is striving to arrange systemic reapproachment and elite compromise.

The societal institutional engineering that is necessary for empowering the mukhliseen-e-deen has not even begun. The vast mass of mukhliseen-e-deen are isolated, disunited and unaware of and disinterested in the need for empowerment. They do not see the state as a site for Islamic struggle and do not contest the rule of law of capital. Islamic revolutionary consciousness – the consciousness that without empowerment Islamic identity will inevitably be submerged in secular order – is almost nonexistent in Pakistan.

The Islamic revolutionary struggle is at an embryonic stage in Pakistan. All Islamic parties have abandoned revolutionary Praxis and have become reconciled to the domination of the rule of law of capital. For this to change it is necessary to unite the political and non-political Islamic parties and to convince them that without the political empowerment of the mukhliseen-e-deen the Islamic identity of Pakistani individuality and society cannot be safeguarded.

This movement for Islamic unity must originate in a mass politics founded on the mosque, the mohalla, the bazaar, and the Jirga which is aimed at the transfer of power from state institutions to institutions at the mass level governed by the mukhliseen-e-deen. This mass-based institutional network must be spread throughout the country and consolidated at the district, provincial, and national levels, and safeguarding it and enhancing its executive power must be the primary concern of the legislative representation of the united Islamic parties.

Building such a micro-political base for the Islamic revolutionary struggle will take time but its process can be greatly accelerated if we succeed in associating the mass Islamic revolutionary moment with Islamic charismatic leadership. The national leader of the United Islamic Movement must be a genuine Waliallah with tremendous spiritual power rooted in the customs and religious traditions of the Muslim masses. As the examples of Iran and Afghanistan have shown Muslim masses are eager followers of genuine Aulia-Allah – Imam Khomeini and Mullah Omar – who alone can lead them from the darkness of secularism to the light of Islam.